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Securing Communication Between Meshes and Beyond with SPIFFE Federation

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Agenda





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Role of Identity in a Service Mesh

Hybrid and Multi-Mesh Challenges


SPIFFE Federation


Demo!





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






An architectural pattern that provides common


network services as a feature of the

infrastructure









SPIFFE Identity

spiffe://cluster-1/my-special-workload

SPIFFE Identity

spiffe://cluster-1/my-special-workload



X509-SVID

SPIFFE Identity


spiffe://cluster-1/my-special-workload




X509-SVID

Identity in a Service Mesh

Central Authority
Common to All



Identity in a Service Mesh







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Hybrid and Multi-Mesh Security Challenges


Hybrid and multi-mesh examples

- Two organizations, each owning a service mesh, want to expose selected services between each other
- A service provider exposes its services to the tenant services
- When partially migrating existing services to a new service mesh framework, the services in both service meshes need to talk to each other as before
- ...

Basic rules from the security lens


- All identities must be derived from trusted roots
 - Impersonation by untrusted PKI not possible
- Trust domain associated with parties/meshes
 - Cross-party impersonation not possible
- Transport + authn compatibility
 - Successful authentication between trusted services
- Security policies explicitly enforce external access control
 - Deny by default for calls from external meshes

Limitations of shared authority



- Independent parties not likely to share common root CA
- Name constraints on intermediate CAs are required

Multiple Independent Authorities



- How do meshes securely exchange roots of trust?
- How to prevent Root CA2 from issuing identities for Mesh Red (and vise versa)?





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SPIFFE Federation

SPIFFE Federation API

"API" for Exchanging Authority Public Keys

Simple HTTPS GET + JWKS

a la OIDC 'jwks_uri'

SPIFFE Federation API

"API" for Exchanging Authority Public Keys


Simple HTTPS GET + JWKS

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
SPIFFE Federation API

```
"keys": [
        "use": "x509-svid",
        "kty": "EC",
        "crv": "P-384",
        "x": "WjB-nSGSxIYiznb84xu5WGDZj80nL7W1c3zf48Why0ma7Y7mCBKzfQkrgDguI4j0",
        "y": "Z-0_tDH_r8gt0tLLrIpuMwWHoe4vbVBFte1vj6Xt6WeE8lXwcCvLs_mcmvPqVK9j",
        "x5c": [ ... ]
    },
        "use": "jwt-svid",
        "kty": "EC",
        "kid": "xhlHFGILDAlsxRiX5v1mUhAAPbT4Bd1I",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "ef6So0wu010a-x1iV30kQ02anlnvMs0QepnRzj4I1bo",
        "y": "dRYfXBz_vl-fJvkN-9tHBt4fiI0RY2GU3dBdJFtSXb8"
"spiffe_refresh_hint": 8600
```

SPIFFE Federation: An Example



SPIFFE Federation: An Example











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Istio and SPIRE














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Demo Time!

Full Disclosure



Learn More







spiffe/spire





evan2645/istio-federation-server



evan2645/kubecon-2019-federation-demo



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Fundamentals for multi-mesh solutions

- Network
 - Through ingress/egress
 - Flat network
- Service discovery
 - KubeDNS / CoreDNS / Global DNS for DNS
 - Define service entries for external service routing
- Security
 - No conflicts of identities across different meshes
 - Roots of trust are shared across meshes
 - Authorization policies involve external identities