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# Navigating Workload Identity in Kubernetes

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# What is workload identity?



# Workload Identity

**Workload** - instances of running code that do "work" for your application.





# How does a workload prove its identity?



# Use cases for workload identity





# **Desirable Properties**

# **Desirable Properties**



- Strongly Authenticated
- Prevent Escalations
- Good UX for Users, Integrators, Cluster Admins
- Performant and Available



# **Options for Workload ID**



In this talk, we will cover 4 options you should consider

- Kubernetes Certificates API
- Kubernetes Service Account Tokens
- Istio
- SPIRE





# Kubernetes Certificates API

# **Design of Certificate Provisioning**



- Multiple asynchronous actors are required to process a CSR.
- Communication flows through the Kubernetes API.
- This pattern looks a lot like any other Kubernetes control process.

# Step 0





# Step 1: Pod submits CSR







# Step 2: CSR Approval





# Step 3: CSR Signing



# Step 4: Pod receives Certificate





# The End







# Approver's Duty



The approver is responsible for verifying the CSR satisfies two requirements:

- Subject of the CSR is the origin of the CSR.
- Subject of the CSR is authorized to act in the request context.

# Summary?







# Kubernetes Service Account Token

# Provisioning a token to a pod





# What the user interacts with





# **Token Volume Config**







### - serviceAccountToken:

path: token
audience: spike@example.com # Kube API by default
expirationSeconds: 1800 # an hour by default

# Zoom Out



kind: Pod

spec:

containers:

- name: my-app
  volumeMounts:
  - name: spike-token
     mountPath: /var/talk-to-spike

volumes:

- name: spike-token
projected:

sources:

- serviceAccountToken:

path: token
audience: spike@example.com
expirationSeconds: 1800





# **Token Validation**



# **Kubernetes Token Assertions**



### Standard Claims:

- Issuer
- Subject
- Audience
- Expiration

Custom Kubernetes Claims:

- Cluster metadata
- Pod metadata
- Node metadata derivable

```
"iss": "https://foo.bar.example.com",
"sub": "system:serviceaccount:myns:test-svcacct",
"iat": 1536353560,
"nbf": 1536353560,
"exp": 1536357160,
"aud": [
  "spike@example.com"
],
"kubernetes.io": {
  "namespace": "myns",
  "pod": {
    "name": "test-pod",
    "uid": "f580d0cf-b2df-11e8-ab2c-480fcf3c8889"
  },
  "serviceaccount": {
    "name": "test-svcacct",
    "uid": "f57f5588-b2df-11e8-ab2c-480fcf3c8889"
  }
```

# Token Validation with TokenReview





# Summary?













# **KASPIRE**







# **SPIFFE Workload API**





# SPIFFE Workload API





Disclaimers

- There are more to these systems than can fit in a 30 minute talk
- Requirements and tradeoffs vary
- Expect all these systems to evolve in the future
- These opinions do not represent Tigera or Google
- Your mileage may vary













![](_page_43_Picture_0.jpeg)

# Q & A