

# **Open Policy Agent**





@OpenPolicyAgent



- Open Policy Agent co-founder and core contributor
- Istio and Kubernetes policy-related features
- 🗢 🗆 good restaurants 🎉 Copenhagen





ternal-s02.acmecorp.com/pages?pageid=settingermsinprod

#### Setting permissions in Production [edit]

**Important notice:** If you are deploying to east\_4A or icebreaker2, you MUST fill out the change request form and submit it through the config-deployment portal before continuing.

Update: 2016-09-16: Jeff is working on automating this process.

NOTE: September, 2017: remember to add the following permissions to your production

×

service.

Group	<b>API Permission</b>	Version
ops-auth	all	•
ops-admin	all	•
net-dev	net/iam	v2.0 and newer

If you are deploying an external service then you need to make sure to configure the network security group rules with using the neteng-dashboard. When you are done file locally for compliance. The following is a list of firewall rules that you should configure.

incoming TCP 9092 subnet 10.2.2.0/24 incoming TCP 9093 subnet 10.2.2.0/24 incoming TCP 10999 subnet 10.2.0.0/16

If your service depends on ext-auth-broker then you MUST configure the egress rules (TODO: include example).

To update services in production, make sure you have checked out and configured the serv-manager CLI tool in your environment. You will need to contact ops-a u config token before you can run any of the commands. Send an e-mail to ops-auth@internal.acmecorp.com with the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the serve-manager clipped and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subject line "NEED TO DEPLOY" (all caps) and second and the subje

Once you have configured serv-manager CLI tool in your environment copy the following files into your ~/ directory.



×



# Policy decisions should be decoupled from policy enforcement.





## Treat policy as a separate concern.

...just like DB, messaging, monitoring, logging, orchestration, CI/CD...





# Gain better control and visibility over policy throughout your system.





# Everyone is affected by policy...





"Analysts can read client data but PII must be redacted."

"QA must sign-off on images deployed to the production namespace."

"Give developers SSH access to machines listed in JIRA tickets assigned to them."

"Restrict ELB changes to senior SREs that are on-call."





# Policy enforcement is a fundamental problem for your organization.





# Tribal knowledge provides NO guarantee that policies are being enforced.

"Tribal knowledge" is the know-how or collective wisdom of the organization.





# It is expensive and painful to maintain policy decisions that are hardcoded into the app.









OPA is an open source, general-purpose policy engine.



# Decisions are decoupled from enforcement.



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# OPA is a host-local cache for policy decisions.













# Policy and data are stored in-memory.

# No runtime dependencies during enforcement.



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"There's nothing wrong with having a tree as a friend."

Employee Details		
Name: Bob Ross	Bob doesn't make n	
Birth Date: October 29, 1942	- Alice	
Position: Cloud Engineer	****	
T-Shirt Size: Medium	Bob's great at build	
Manager: Janet	- Janet	
<b>SSN:</b> 1234567890	****	

#### Performance Reviews

mistakes. Only happy accidents.

ling happy little clouds.





 $\leftarrow \rightarrow$  C  $\triangle$  (i) localhost/bob

#### landing page service

#### 1 bob ( sign out )





#### reviews service





#### Manager: Janet SSN: 1234567890

Name: Bob Ross







(i) localhost/bob

C  $\hat{\Omega}$ 

## **Demo:** Authorization







## **Demo:** Authorization







# Declarative Language (Rego)

- Is user X allowed to call operation Y on resource Z?
- Which annotations must be added to new Deployments?
- Which users can SSH into production machines?





### "Employees may read their own reviews and the reviews of their subordinates."









#### <u>Input</u>

{"method": "GET",
 "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
 "user": "bob"}





```
allow = true {
    input.method = "GET"
    input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
    input.user = employee_id
```

```
<u>Input</u>
```

```
{"method": "GET",
    "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
    "user": "bob"}
```



}



```
allow = true {
    input.method = "GET"
    input.path = ["reviews", "bob"]
    input.user = "bob"
```

#### <u>Input</u>

```
{"method": "GET",
    "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
    "user": "bob"}
```



}



```
allow = true {
    input.method = "GET"  # OK
    input.path = ["reviews", "bob"] # OK
    input.user = "bob" # OK
```

#### <u>Input</u>

```
{"method": "GET",
    "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
    "user": "bob"}
```



}



```
allow = true {
    input.method = "GET"
    input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
    input.user = employee_id
```

#### <u>Input</u>

```
{"method": "GET",
  "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
  "user": "alice"}
```

"alice" instead of "bob"





```
allow = true {
 input.method = "GET"
                                   # OK
 input.path = ["reviews", "bob"] # OK
 "alice" = "bob"
                                   # FAIL
```

#### <u>Input</u>



"alice" instead of "bob"





```
allow = true {
    input.method = "GET"  # OK
    input.path = ["reviews", "bob"] # OK
    "alice" = "bob"  # FAIL
```





"alice" instead of "bob"





```
allow = true {
    input.method = "GET"
    input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
    input.user = employee_id
```

#### <u>Input</u>

```
{"method": "GET",
    "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
    "user": "alice"}
```

```
{"manager_of": {
    "bob": "alice",
    "alice": "janet"}}
```





```
<u>Input</u>
allow = true {
  input.method = "GET"
                                                  {"method": "GET",
                                                   "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
  input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
                                                   "user": "alice"}
  input.user = employee_id
                                                  <u>Data (in-memory)</u>
allow = true {
                                                  {"manager_of": {
                                                    "bob": "alice",
  input.method = "GET"
                                                    "alice": "janet"}
  input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
  input.user = data.manager_of[employee_id]
```





```
allow = true {
  input.method = "GET"
  input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
  input.user = employee_id
allow = true {
  input.method = "GET"
  input.path = ["reviews", "bob"]
  input.user = data.manager_of["bob"]
```

#### <u>Input</u>

```
{"method": "GET",
    "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
    "user": "alice"}
```

```
{"manager_of": {
    "bob": "alice",
    "alice": "janet"}}
```





```
allow = true {
  input.method = "GET"
  input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
  input.user = employee_id
allow = true {
  input.method = "GET"
  input.path = ["reviews", "bob"]
  input.user = "alice"
```

#### <u>Input</u>

```
{"method": "GET",
    "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
    "user": "alice"}
```

```
{"manager_of": {
    "bob": "alice",
    "alice": "janet"}}
```





```
allow = true {
  input.method = "GET"
  input.path = ["reviews", employee_id]
  input.user = employee_id
allow = true {
  input.method = "GET"
                                   # 0K
  input.path = ["reviews", "bob"] # OK
  input.user = "alice"
                                   # 0K
```

@sometorin

#### <u>Input</u>

```
{"method": "GET",
    "path": ["reviews", "bob"],
    "user": "alice"}
```

```
{"manager_of": {
    "bob": "alice",
    "alice": "janet"}}
```



## What about RBAC?





## RBAC solves XX% of the problem.





"Allow all HTTP requests from 10.1.2.0/24."

"Restrict employees from accessing the service outside of work hours."

"QA must sign-off on images deployed to the production namespace." "Restrict ELB changes to senior SREs that are on-call."

> "Analysts can read client data but PII must be redacted."

# RBAC is not enough.

"Prevent developers from running containers with privileged security contexts in the production namespace." "Give developers SSH access to machines listed in JIRA tickets assigned to them."

"Workloads for euro-bank must be deployed on PCI-certified clusters in the EU."





## ...but everyone knows RBAC.





#### Data (in-memory)

bindings:

- user: inspector-alice
   role: widget-reader
- user: maker-bob role: widget-writer

- operation: read
   resource: widgets
   name: widget-reader
- operation: write resource: widgets name: widget-writer





allow = true {
 # Find binding(s) for user.
 binding := data.bindings[\_]
 input.user = binding.user

#### <u>Data (in-memory)</u>

#### bindings:

- user: inspector-alice
   role: widget-reader
- user: maker-bob
   role: widget-writer

- operation: read
   resource: widgets
   name: widget-reader
- operation: write
   resource: widgets
   name: widget-writer





allow = true {
 # Find binding(s) for user.
 binding := data.bindings[\_]
 input.user = binding.user

# Find role(s) with permission.
role := data.roles[\_]
input.resource = role.resource
input.operation = role.operation

#### Data (in-memory)

#### bindings:

- user: inspector-alice
   role: widget-reader
- user: maker-bob
   role: widget-writer

- operation: read
   resource: widgets
   name: widget-reader
- operation: write
   resource: widgets
   name: widget-writer





allow = true {
 # Find binding(s) for user.
 binding := data.bindings[\_]
 input.user = binding.user

# Find role(s) with permission.
role := data.roles[\_]
input.resource = role.resource
input.operation = role.operation

# Check if binding matches role. role.name = binding.role

#### Data (in-memory)

#### bindings:

- user: inspector-alice
   role: widget-reader
- user: maker-bob
   role: widget-writer
  }

- operation: read resource: widgets name: widget-reader
- operation: write resource: widgets name: widget-writer





### This rule *searches* over the RBAC data.

allow = true {
 # Find binding(s) for user.
 binding := data.bindings[\_]
 input.user = binding.user

# Find role(s) with permission.
role := data.roles[\_]
input.resource = role.resource
input.operation = role.operation

# Check if binding matches role. role.name = binding.role <u>Data (in-memory)</u>

# Find bindings and roles that match

input role:widget-writer

- operation: read resource: widgets
  - name: widget-reader
- operation: write resource: widgets name: widget-writer





### Partial Evaluation: rules + data $\Rightarrow$ simplified rules

#### allow = true {

# Find binding(s) for user. binding := data.bindings[\_] input.user = binding.user

# Find role(s) with permission.
role := data.roles[\_]
input.resource = role.resource
input.operation = role.operation

# Check if binding matches role
role.name = binding.role

#### <u>Data (in-memory)</u>

#### bindings:

- user: inspector-alice role: widget-reader
- user: maker-bob

role: widget-writer
roles:

- operation: read resource: widgets name: widget-reader
- operation: write resource: widgets name: widget-writer



Partial Eval

# allow = true { input.user = "bob" input.resource = "/widgets" input.operation = "write"

allow = true {
 input.user = "alice"
 input.resource = "/widgets"
 input.operation = "read"
}



### OPA builds an index from simplified rules.







## OPA uses the index to quickly find applicable rules.







### OPA only evaluates applicable rules.









# Roles	# Bindings	Normal Eval (ms)	With Partial Eval (ms)
250	250	5.50	0.0468
500	500	11.87	0.0591
1,000	1,000	21.64	0.0543
2,000	2,000	45.49	0.0624

blog.openpolicyagent.org

Partial Evaluation <u>https://goo.gl/X6Qu6u</u> Rule Indexing <u>https://goo.gl/uoSw3U</u>





"Analysts can read client data but PII must be redacted."

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"Give developers SSH access to machines listed in JIRA tickets assigned to them."

"Restrict ELB changes to senior SREs that are on-call."





# Use OPA to enforce policy across the stack.







# It's all just data.

#### allow { deny { not metadata.labels["ga-signoff"] input.method = "GET" input.path = ["salary", user] metadata.namespace == "prod" spec.containers[\_].privileged input.user = user name: nginx-149353-bvl8g path: /salary/bob namespace: production service.source: service: landing\_page service.target: securitvContext: service: details privileged: true allow { deny { is\_read\_operation score = risk\_budget count(plan\_names["aws\_iam"]) == 0 is\_pii\_topic not in\_pii\_consumer\_whitelist blast radius < 500 နို operation: Read aws\_autoscaling\_group.lamb: availability\_zones#: '1' kafka name: credit-scores availability\_zones.3205: us-west-1a resourceType: Topic desired\_capacity: '4 launch\_configuration: kitten

principal:

principalType: User

name: CN=anon producer.0=0PA

🥑 @sometorin



ami: ami-09b4b74c

## User Study: Netflix

- Complex environment
  - >1,000 services
  - Many resource and identity types
  - Many protocols, languages, etc.
- Key requirements
  - Low latency
  - Flexible policies
  - Ability to capture intent
- Using OPA across the stack
  - HTTP and gRPC APIs
  - Kafka producers
  - SSH (coming soon)



How Netflix is Solving Authorization Across Their Cloud (KubeCon US 2017)





# 20+ companies using OPA. Financial institutions,

service providers, IT companies, software vendors, etc.

# Used across the stack. Microservices, orchestration,

provisioning, host daemons, data layer, security groups, etc.

## Bring more use cases. RBAC, ABAC, admission

control, data protection, risk management, rate liming, auditing, etc.





## Demo





# Policy decisions should be decoupled from policy enforcement.







#### **Admission Control**



#### **Risk Management**



# Try tutorials at openpolicyagent.org









# Leverage OPA to solve fundamental policy and security problems.





## Thank You!

# C open-policy-agent/opa

## Star us on GitHub.







SANDBOX