class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide # Compensating Wage Differentials ## EC 350: Labor Economics ###
Kyle Raze
### Winter 2022 --- # Jardim et al. (2017) ## **Discussion about the** [**Seattle minimum wage study**](https://evans.uw.edu/faculty-research/research-projects-and-initiatives/the-minimum-wage-study/) **Q.sub[1]:** What data did the authors bring to bear? How do these data differ from other studies? **Q.sub[2]:** How did the authors estimate the impact of Seattle's minimum wage increase? **Q.sub[3]:** What did the authors find? **Q.sub[4]:** How do the findings compare to other studies? **Q.sub[5]:** What are the weaknesses of the study? How might those weaknesses affect the results? **Q.sub[6]:** What are the policy implications of the study? **Q.sub[7]:** Did the study make you update your beliefs about the minimum wage? Why or why not? --- class: inverse, middle # Compensating wage differentials --- # Compensating wage differentials **Q:** Why are some workers paid more than others? -- - Differences in preferences? - Differences in human capital? - Discrimination? - Differences in .pink[working conditions?] -- .center[**Even within the same industry, some jobs are riskier than others!**] .pull-left[ <img src="risky_job.jpg" width="359" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] .pull-right[ <img src="safe_job.jpg" width="350" style="display: block; margin: auto;" /> ] --- # Compensating wage differentials **The idea?** Wages can compensate for non-monetary aspects of a job. -- > The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of different employment of labour and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality. <br> .right[— [Adam Smith](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Smith)] -- **Examples?** - Hazard pay for grocery store workers during the pandemic - Wage premium for risky jobs (*e.g.,* [*Deadliest Catch*](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1807236)) - Wage penalty for fun/fulfilling occupations (*e.g.,* art, music, ["lifestyle PhDs"](http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/if-you-get-phd-get-economics-phd.html#:~:text=1.,sitting%20and%20thinking%20about%20stuff.), *etc.*) --- # Market for risky jobs .pull-left[ ## .hi-pink[Supply] .pink[Workers] care about wages `\(w\)` and the risk of injury `\(\rho\)`: `$$U = f(w, \rho)$$` - Workers are risk averse. - Wages are a "good:" `\(U\)` increases with `\(w\)`. - Injury risk is a "bad:" `\(U\)` decreases with `\(\rho\)`. - An employer would need to pay a **wage premium** to convince a worker to take a **riskier job**. ] .pull-right[ ] --- count: false # Market for risky jobs .pull-left[ ## .hi-pink[Supply] .pink[Workers] care about wages `\(w\)` and the risk of injury `\(\rho\)`: `$$U = f(w, \rho)$$` - Workers are risk averse. - Wages are a "good:" `\(U\)` increases with `\(w\)`. - Injury risk is a "bad:" `\(U\)` decreases with `\(\rho\)`. - An employer would need to pay a **wage premium** to convince a worker to take a **riskier job**. ] .pull-right[ ## .hi-purple[Demand] .purple[Employers] care about profit, which depends on compensation bundles of wages `\(w\)` and injury risk `\(\rho\)`. - Both wages and safe working conditions are costly. - To **increase wages** and keep the same profit, an employer would need to **cut back on safety** initiatives. - To **reduce injury risk** and keep the same profit, an employer would need to **cut wages**. ] --- # Risk preferences .pull-left[ ] .pull-right[ An **indifference curve** shows all of the wage-risk bundles that yield the same utility. 1. **Upward sloping:** Additional risk requires additional pay to keep the same utility. 2. **Convex** 3. Wage-risk bundles on **higher indifference curves** yield **higher utility**. ] --- # Risk preferences .pull-left[ ] .pull-right[ **Different workers** can have **different risk preferences**. - Some workers dislike injury risk more than others. - Workers with steeper indifference curves are more risk-averse. - Workers with flatter indifference curves are less risk-averse. ] --- # Profit .pull-left[ ] .pull-right[ An **iso-profit curve** shows all of the wage-risk bundles that yield the same profit. 1. **Upward sloping:** Safety and wages are costly. - To keep the same profit, increasing one requires reducing the other. 2. **Concave:** Diminishing returns to safety lead to increasing marginal cost of risk abatement. 3. Wage-risk bundles on **higher iso-profit curves** yield **lower profit**. ] --- # Equilibrium .pull-left[ ] .pull-right[ In equilibrium, workers **match** with employers. - Most risk-averse worker .mono[<->] safest employer - Least risk-averse worker .mono[<->] riskiest employer The **Hedonic wage function** describes the relationship between wages and job characteristics (*e.g.,* injury risk). - Upward sloping for "disamenities." - Downward sloping for amenities (*e.g.,* generosity of health insurance plan). ] --- # Safety regulation **Case 1:** Workers fully aware of workplace hazards. --- # Safety regulation **Case 2:** Workers misinformed about workplace hazards. --- # Value of a statistical life **Q:** How much money are workers willing to give up in exchange for a marginal reduction in fatality risk? - **Q:** Or, how much money would workers willingly accept in exchange for a marginal increase in fatality risk? -- Other things being equal, **riskier occupations tend to pay more** than safer occupations. - **Example:** Employer Y has a riskier work environment than Employer X, but workers at Y willingly accept this added risk because they are paid a compensating differential of $7,600 per year. | Employer | Probability of fatal injury | Annual wage earnings | |:--------:|:---------------------------:|:-------------------------------------------:| | X | *ρ*.sub[X] | *w*<sub>X</sub> | | Y | *ρ*.sub[X] .mono[+] 0.001 | *w*.sub[X] .mono[+] $7,600 | --- # Value of a statistical life The **value of a statistical life**.super[.hi-pink[<span>†</span>]] (VSL) describes the strength of the relationship between fatality risk and wages. .footnote[.super[.hi-pink[<span>†</span>]] A prime example of how *not* to brand a useful concept.] -- - The **hypothetical amount of money** a person would accept to increase their probability of death from 0 to 1. - Despite its dismal name, VSL is estimated from observed **responses to small changes** in fatality risk. -- **How is this useful?** Helps governments weigh the tradeoffs of safety regulations and environmental policies. - Safety regulations can save lives (benefit) in exchange for reduced economic activity (cost). - Easy to ignore benefits when they aren't directly comparable to the costs! --- # Value of a statistical life ## **Estimation** Using data on wages and fatality risk for different occupations, a researcher can estimate a **Hedonic regression:** `$$\text{Wage}_i = \alpha + \beta~\text{Risk}_i + \text{other variables} + \varepsilon_i$$` - `\(\text{Wage}_i\)` represents the annual wage for occupation `\(i\)`. - `\(\text{Risk}_i\)` represents the annual probability of death in occupation `\(i\)`. - `\(\beta\)` represents the value of a statistical life..super[.hi-pink[<span>†</span>]] .footnote[.super[.hi-pink[<span>†</span>]] Previously published VSL estimates range from 1 to 12 million dollars. The Environmental Protection Agency uses a VSL of $10 million for cost-benefit analysis.] --- # Value of a statistical life ## **Discussion** `$$\text{Wage}_i = \alpha + \beta~\text{Risk}_i + \text{other variables} + \varepsilon_i$$` **Q.sub[1]:** Estimates of `\(\beta\)` are often *negative* when researchers fail to include "other variables." Why? **Q.sub[2]:** What "other variables" should a researcher include to isolate the causal effect of risk on wages? --- # Housekeeping **Assigned reading for Wednesday:** [The effect of human capital on earnings: Evidence from a reform at Colombia's top university](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0047272717301809) by Carolina Arteaga (2018). - Reading Quiz 8 is due by **Wednesday, February 23rd at 12:00pm (noon)**. - The quiz instructions will include a reading guide. **Problem Set 3** is due by **Friday, February 25th at 11:59pm**.