Controls EC 607, Set 06

Edward Rubin Spring 2021

Prologue

Schedule

Last time

The conditional independence assumption: $\{\mathbf{Y}_{0i}, \mathbf{Y}_{1i}\} \perp \mathbf{D}_i | \mathbf{X}_i$ *I.e.*, conditional on some controls (\mathbf{X}_i) , treatment is as-good-as random.

Today

- Omitted variable bias
- Good vs. bad controls

Upcoming

• Topics: Matching estimators

Revisiting an old friend

Let's start where we left off: Returns to schooling.

We have two linear, population models

$$\mathbf{Y}_i = \alpha + \rho \mathbf{s}_i + \eta_i \tag{1}$$

$$Y_i = \alpha + \rho s_i + X'_i \gamma + \nu_i \tag{2}$$

We should not interpret $\hat{\rho}$ causally in model (1) (for fear of selection bias).

For model (2), we can interpret $\hat{\rho}$ causally **if** $Y_{si} \perp I s_i | X_i$ (CIA).

In other words, the CIA says that our **observable vector** X_i **must explain all of correlation between** s_i **and** η_i .

The OVB formula

We can use the omitted-variable bias (OVB) formula to compare regression estimates from **models with different sets of control variables**.

We're concerned about selection and want to use a set of control variables to account for ability (A_i) —family background, motivation, intelligence.

$$\mathbf{Y}_i = \alpha + \beta \mathbf{s}_i + v_i \tag{1}$$

$$\mathbf{Y}_i = \pi + \rho \mathbf{s}_i + \mathbf{A}'_i \gamma + e_i$$
 (2)

What happens if we can't get data on A_i and opt for (1)?

$$rac{\mathrm{Cov}(\mathrm{Y}_i,\,\mathrm{s}_i)}{\mathrm{Var}(\mathrm{s}_i)} =
ho + \gamma' \delta_{As}$$

where δ_{As} are coefficients from regressing A_i on s_i .

Interpretation

Our two regressions

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{Y}_{i} &= \alpha + \beta \mathbf{s}_{i} + v_{i} \\ \mathbf{Y}_{i} &= \pi + \rho \mathbf{s}_{i} + \mathbf{A}_{i}' \gamma + e_{i} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

will yield the same estimates for the returns to schooling

$$rac{\mathrm{Cov}(\mathrm{Y}_i,\,\mathrm{s}_i)}{\mathrm{Var}(\mathrm{s}_i)} =
ho + \gamma' \delta_{As}$$

if (**a**) schooling is uncorrelated with ability ($\delta_{As} = 0$) or (**b**) ability is uncorrelated with earnings, conditional on schooling ($\gamma = 0$).

Example

Table 3.2.1, The returns to schooling					
	1	2	3	4	
Schooling	0.132	0.131	0.114	0.087	
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
Controls	None	Age Dum.	2 + Add'l	3 + AFQT	

Table 2.24. The mature to ask asking

Here we have four specifications of controls for a regression of log wages on years of schooling (from the NLSY).

Example

Table 3.2.1, The returns to schooling					
	1	2	3	4	
Schooling	0.132	0.131	0.114	0.087	
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
Controls	None	Age Dum.	2 + Add'l	3 + AFQT	

Table 2.24. The water was to ask a sliver

Column 1 (no control variables) suggests a 13.2% increase in wages for an additional year of schooling.

Example

Table 3.2.1, The returns to schooling							
	1 2 3 4						
Schooling	0.132	0.131	0.114	0.087			
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)			
Controls	None	Age Dum.	2 + Add'l	3 + AFQT			

Column 2 (age dummies) suggests a 13.1% increase in wages for an additional year of schooling.

Example

Table 3.2.1, The returns to schooling							
	1 2 3 4						
Schooling	0.132	0.131	0.114	0.087			
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)			
Controls	None	Age Dum.	2 + Add'l	3 + AFQT			

Column 3 (column 2 controls plus parents' ed. and self demographics) suggests a 11.4% increase in wages for an additional year of schooling.

Example

	1	2	3	4	
Schooling	0.132	0.131	0.114	0.087	
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	
Controls	None	Age Dum.	2 + Add'l	3 + AFQT	

Table 2.21 The returns to achooling

Column 4 (column 3 controls plus AFQT[†] score) suggests a 8.7% increase in wages for an additional year of schooling.

Example

Table 3.2.1, The returns to schooling						
	1	2	3	4		
Schooling	0.132	0.131	0.114	0.087		
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)		
Controls	None	Age Dum.	2 + Add'l	3 + AFQT		

As we ratchet up controls, the estimated returns to schooling drop by 4.5 percentage points (34% drop in the coefficient) from **Column 1** to **Column 4**.

$$rac{\mathrm{Cov}(\mathrm{Y}_i,\,\mathrm{s}_i)}{\mathrm{Var}(\mathrm{s}_i)} =
ho + \gamma' \delta_{As}$$

If we think **ability positively affects wages**, then it looks like we also have **positive selection into schooling**.



Omitted: X₂ and X₃

Note

This OVB formula **does not** require either of the models to be causal.

The formula compares the regression coefficient in a **short model** to the regression coefficient on the same variable in a **long model**.[†]

The OVB formula and the CIA[†]

In addition to helping us think through and sign OVB, the formula

$$rac{\mathrm{Cov}(\mathrm{Y}_i,\,\mathrm{s}_i)}{\mathrm{Var}(\mathrm{s}_i)} =
ho + \gamma' \delta_{As}$$

drives home the point that we're leaning *very* hard on the conditional independence assumption to be able to interpret our coefficients as causal.

Q When is the CIA plausible?

A Two potential answers

- 1. Randomized experiments
- 2. Programs with arbitrary cutoffs/lotteries

† The title for my first spy novel.

Control variables play an enormous role in our quest for causality (the CIA).

Q Are "more controls" always better (or at least never worse)?

A No. There are such things as...

Defined

Q What's a *bad* control—when can a control make a bad situation worse?

A *Bad controls* are variables that are (also) affected by treatment. *Note* There are other types of *bad controls* too. More soon (DAGs).

Q Okay, so why is it bad to control using a variable affected by treatment?

Hint It's a flavor of selection bias.

Let's consider an example...

Example

Suppose we want to know the effect of college graduation on wages.

1. There are only two types of jobs: blue collar and white collar.

- 2. White-collar jobs, on average, pay more than blue-collar jobs.
- 3. Graduating college increases the likelihood of a white-collar job.

Q Should we control for occupation type when considering the effect of college graduation on wages? (Will occupation be an omitted variable?)

A No. Imagine college degrees are randomly assigned. When we condition on occupation, we compare degree-earners who chose blue-collar jobs to non-degree-earners who chose blue-collar jobs. Our assumption of random degrees says **nothing** about random job selection. Bad controls can undo valid randomizations.

Formal-ish derivation

More formally, let

- \mathbf{W}_i be a dummy for whether i has a white-collar job
- Y_i denote *i*'s earnings
- C_i refer to *i*'s **randomly assigned** college-graduation status

$$egin{aligned} \mathrm{Y}_i &= \mathrm{C}_i \mathrm{Y}_{1i} + \left(1 - \mathrm{C}_i
ight) \mathrm{Y}_{0i} \ \mathrm{W}_i &= \mathrm{C}_i \mathrm{W}_{1i} + \left(1 - \mathrm{C}_i
ight) \mathrm{W}_{0i} \end{aligned}$$

Becuase we've assumed C_i is randomly assigned, differences in means yield causal estimates, *i.e.*,

$$E[\mathbf{Y}_i \mid \mathbf{C}_i = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_i \mid \mathbf{C}_i = 0] = E[\mathbf{Y}_{1i} - \mathbf{Y}_{0i}]$$
$$E[\mathbf{W}_i \mid \mathbf{C}_i = 1] - E[\mathbf{W}_i \mid \mathbf{C}_i = 0] = E[\mathbf{W}_{1i} - \mathbf{W}_{0i}]$$

Formal-ish derivation, continued

Let's see what happens when we throw in some controls—*e.g.*, focusing on the the wage-effect of college graduation for white-collar jobs.

$$E[\mathbf{Y}_i \mid \mathbf{W}_i = 1, \, \mathbf{C}_i = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_i \mid \mathbf{W}_i = 1, \, \mathbf{C}_i = 0]$$

$$= E[\mathbf{Y}_{1i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1, \, \mathbf{C}_i = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{0i} = 1, \, \mathbf{C}_i = 0]$$

$$= E[\mathbf{Y}_{1i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{0i} = 1]$$

$$= E[\mathbf{Y}_{1i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1] \\ + E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{0i} = 1]$$

$$=\underbrace{E[\mathbf{Y}_{1i} - \mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1]}_{\text{Causal effect on white-collar workers}} + \underbrace{E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{0i} = 1]}_{\text{Selection bias}}$$

Formal-ish derivation, continued

By introducing a bad control, we introduced selection bias into a setting that did not have selection bias without controls.

Specifically, the selection bias term

$$E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{1i} = 1] - E[\mathbf{Y}_{0i} \mid \mathbf{W}_{0i} = 1]$$

describes how college graduation changes the composition of the pool of white-collar workers.

Note Even if the causal effect is zero, this selection bias need not be zero.

A trickier example

A timely/trickier example: Wage gaps (*e.g.*, female-male or black-white).

Q Should we control for occupation when we consider wage gaps?

- What are we trying to capture?
- If we're concerned about discrimination, it seems likely that discrimination also affects occupational choice and hiring outcomes.
- Some motivate occupation controls with groups' differential preferences.

What's the answer?

Proxy variables

Angrist and Pischke bring up an interesting scenario that intersects omitted-variable bias and bad controls.

- We want to estimate the returns to education.
- Ability is omitted.
- We have a proxy for ability—a test taken after schooling finishes.

We're a bit stuck.

- 1. If we omit the test altogether, we've got omitted-variable bias.
- 2. If we include our proxy, we've got a bad control.

With some math/luck, we can bound the true effect with these estimates.

Example

Returning to our OVB-motivated example, we control for occupation.

Table 3.2.1, The returns to schooling						
	1	2	3	4	5	
Schooling	0.132	0.131	0.114	0.087	0.066	
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	
Controls	None	Age Dum.	2 + Add'l	3 + AFQT	4 + Occupation	

Schooling likely affects occupation; how do we interpret the new results?

Conclusion

Timing matters.

The right controls can help tremendously, but bad controls hurt.

Table of contents

Admin

1. Schedule

Controls

- 1. Omitted-variable bias
 - The formula
 - Example
 - OVB Venn
 - OVB and the CIA
- 2. Bad controls
 - Defined
 - Example
 - Formalization(ish)
 - Trickier example
 - Bad proxy conundrum
 - Empirical example